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Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to solve the liar paradox: dif-
ferent stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction is
dispelled. The word ‘true’ is relativized by the contextualists to contexts of use.
This paper shows that contextualist approaches to the liar are committed to a
form of semantic relativism: that the truth value of some sentences depends on
the context of assessment, as well as the context of use. In particular, it is shown
how Simmons’s and Glanzberg’s contextualist approaches entail relativism. In
both cases, the liar sentence gets different semantic evaluations as uttered in a
fixed context of use but assessed from different contexts. Shift in context of use
alone cannot provide the full explanation of the liar. These contextualist ap-
proaches, as originally presented, were thus mischaracterised and they should
be re-evaluated according to their full implications.
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1 Introduction
Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to explain or dissolve the liar para-
dox: different stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction
is dispelled. What is meant by contextualism is relativity of semantic value or exten-
sion to context. Specifically, it is the context of use or utterance of an expression that
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is referred to. Contextualism as a solution to the liar has been endorsed in various
forms.1 Recently, there have been defenses of another kind of context sensitivity for
certain expressions, namely, sensitivity to context of assessment. That is, the context in
which a sentence containing the relevant expression is assessed affects the extension,
i.e. the truth value of that sentence. This semantic approach is known as relativism.2
What happens with the word ‘true’? Notice that (generally speaking) when ‘true’
occurs, some sentence is assessed. So the context of utterance of ’true’ is also a context
of assessment of some sentence or utterance. This leads to the natural conjecture
that contextualism about truth entails relativism about truth. In this paper I give
an argument to this effect, and explore further consequences for contextualism and
relativism. My aim will not be to defend either view, but rather to show the connection
between the views.
In §§2-3 I present, in a general way, the contextualist approach to the liar and
show that it entails relativism about ‘true’. In §4 I show that relativism about any
expression entails both contextualism about ‘true’ or some other semantic expression,
and relativism about ‘true’, and so we seem to reach a full circle. In §5 I take on two
case studies of contextualists about truth, Keith Simmons and Michael Glanzberg, and
show how in particular their theories are committed to a form of relativism. In §6 I
conclude, leaving open the question of whether the relativist approach entailed by
contextualism can serve as a viable account of the liar.
2 Contextualism and the Strengthened Liar Discourse
Contextualists appeal to notions from linguistics and the philosophy of language to
solve the liar paradox. Thus they employ a natural language perspective on the liar,
analyzing the discourse in which a contradiction is seemingly derived. Specifically,
they employ the idea of a context shift throughout the discourse, so that sensitivity
to context explains conflicting evaluations of the same sentence. I shall leave the
notion of context schematic for the sake of generality, so that the argument will apply
1The earlier examples, to which I will not refer, include: (Parsons, 1974; Burge, 1979; Barwise &
Etchemendy, 1987).
2Relativism has been endorsed with respect to, e.g., predicates of taste, epistemic modals and knowl-
edge attributions. In presenting relativism I loosely follow (MacFarlane, 2014). For a variety of relativis-
tic approaches, see (Garcı́a-Carpintero & Kölbel, 2008).
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most widely. In §3 I will add some minimal assumptions relating contexts of use
and contexts of assessment. What the contextualists I discuss later on do share is that
sentences are used in contexts, contexts have a time component, and contexts may
be affected by sentences previously uttered. Of course, contexts may (and should) be
thought of as richer than that (e.g. as containing also a world and agent component),
but here we leave their exact specification open.
The discourse at focus is the one concerning the “strengthened liar”, i.e. the sen-
tence that says of itself that it is not true.3 The discourse proceeds as follows.4 We
start out by encountering the (strengthened) liar sentence, labeled (L):
1. (L): (L) is not true.
We then attempt to assign (L) a truth value. On the assumption that (L) is true, (L)
then must not be true. On the assumption that (L) is not true, we find that (L) must
then be true. (L) resists being evaluated, and thus we infer that:
2. (L) is defective.
Now, since (L) is defective it cannot be true, so we infer:
3. (L) is not true.
But now it seems that we inferred (L) itself, and thus we infer that after all:
4. (L) is true.
We observe that (L) appears twice in this reasoning. After the first time it appears, in
line (1), (L) is found to be defective. The second time it appears, in line (3), it is found
to be true. This alteration in semantic evaluation is then explained by a context shift:
stages (1) and (3) occur in different contexts, and relativizing to contexts there is no
contradiction after all.
The primary challenge for contextualists who employ this account of the liar dis-
course is to explain the feasibility of a context shift between (1) and (3) philosophically
3The liar here is “strengthened”, since by contrast to the ordinary liar that ascribes falsity to itself,
the ascription of un-truth resists simple gap-theoretic solutions.
4This presentation of the strengthened liar discourse follows (Simmons, 2015) in general lines. I
will reformulate the discourse in accordance with the different details in Simmons’s and Glanzberg’s
presentations when I discuss their views.
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and formally. Contemporary theories of context provide a useful tool for contextual-
ists about truth. The key idea is that an assertion made in a discourse may change the
common background knowledge of the participants and by that change the relevant
context (see e.g. (Stalnaker, 1978) and (Lewis, 1979)). Here, in the liar discourse, the
information that (L) is defective produces the relevant change. We start out in an un-
reflective context, where no kind of assessment of the liar is assumed. Realizing that
the liar sentence is defective, we are moved to a reflective context in which we restate
the liar, and at that time it is true (Simmons, 2015; Glanzberg, 2001; Simmons, 1993;
Glanzberg, 2004).
The context at stake, which is taken as an extra parameter in the evaluation of the
liar, is the context of use or utterance. We may add the following definition:
• A sentence s is use-sensitive if s’s evaluation depends on the context of use.
Specifically, if s is use-sensitive there are contexts c1 , c2 in which s has con-
flicting semantic values.5
The liar sentence is uttered twice, and each time, it seems, it merits a different evalu-
ation. By the above definition, the liar is thus use-sensitive.
At this point, I would like to merely make a note that in each stage of the reasoning,
a truth value assessment of some sentence is expressed by use of the object-language
truth-predicate. The context of use of that assessment can be viewed as a context
of assessment of the sentence mentioned, given that we are willing to countenance
assessments in the object language. Thus, (L) is assessed in different stages of the
reasoning. Given that there is a context shift somewhere between (1) and (4), (L) is as-
sessed from at least two different contexts. These assessments give different verdicts,
and thus it seems that we are prima facie provided with the option of attributing the
change in evaluation to the context of assessment rather than the context of use. In
the following sections I show that it is the former kind of sensitivity that contextual-
ists are committed to by their own reasoning. There is no conflict between relativism
5Conflicting values must be distinct. However, not all distinct values are conflicting. I will not define
conflicting values, but will rather go case by case. Thus, if s receives ‘true’ and ‘false’ in two different
contexts of use, s is use-sensitive, but if s receives ‘not true’ and ‘false’ in two different contexts of use, s
is still not shown to be use-sensitive, since the evaluations are not in conflict. Less obviously, as we shall
see, we will need to accept that ‘defective’ and ‘not true’ are conflicting values. This is based on the fact
that we reached the conclusion that (L) is defective by denying its being not true.
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and contextualism in the sense that an expression can be sensitive to both context of
assessment and context of use, and the authors I discuss can thus hold both to be true.
However, they admit only to holding the latter, and thus they mischaracterize their
own approach: shift in context of use does not fully explain the liar reasoning.
3 From Contextualism to Relativism
My aim is to show that contextualism about truth, as presented in the previous sec-
tion, or as endorsed by either Simmons or Glanzberg, entails a form of relativism or
assessment sensitivity about truth. I will show that under assumptions that ought to
be congenial to the contextualists, ‘true’ is sensitive to context of assessment. How-
ever, if one rejects these assumptions, we are still left with a form of relativity: we
shall see that contextualism as presented here at the very least yields relativism in a
very general sense, by which truth-value is not determined by a sentence, context of
use and circumstance of evaluation.
One crucial assumption that I will make and that will get the stronger argument
running is that assessments can be expressed in the object language, so that the var-
ious steps in the liar discourse can be treated as assessments of the liar. This as-
sumption might seem foreign to relativists, who ordinarily separate the use of ‘true’
in the object-language and truth in the metalanguage as a value in the semantic the-
ory (MacFarlane, 2005, p. 315). But the discussion on the liar paradox calls for an-
other perspective, as the goal is to account for an object-language truth predicate in
a way that will capture its role as providing a semantic assessment without running
into triviality. Indeed, the contextualists we discuss treat the truth predicate as that
which expresses the semantic value assigned to the truth bearers, be they sentences or
propositions. It is by following the stages of the liar discourse as correctly assigning a
semantic value to the liar that the contextualists substantiate their view that there is a
context-shift. Thus, given that the general aim of contextualist solutions to the liar is
to consistently include ‘true’ in the object language in a manner faithful to its role in
semantic theory, the inclusion of assessments in the object language, or the labeling
of truth attributions in the object language as assessments, is a natural move.
An added assumption we make is that contexts of use and contexts of assessment
are of the same kind (as in (MacFarlane, 2014, 60)), or are at least correlated so that a
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difference in context of utterance of two assessments of the same utterance amounts
to a difference in context of assessment of the utterance assessed.6
We note that for the contextualists we are dealing with, the truth bearers are either
sentence tokens or propositions. In the latter case, a proposition is determined or ex-
pressed by a sentence in context. In what follows I shall refer to such sentence-context
pairs as utterances for brevity, and will ignore the possible theoretical differences be-
tween utterances, sentence tokens and sentence (types) in context.7
We shall make use of the following definitions: Let α,β be utterances, sα and sβ the
associated sentences and cα and cβ the associated contexts of use respectively.
• β is an assessment of α if β assigns to α (an outcome of) a truth evaluation, e.g.
‘α is true’, ‘α is false’, but also ‘α is not true’, ‘α is defective’ and ‘α has no truth
conditions/truth value’. If propositions are taken to be the truth bearers, then
assessments will be of the form: ‘α expresses a true proposition’, ‘α expresses a
false proposition’, as well as ‘α does not express a proposition’, etc.
Admittedly, this is a vague definition, but since we deal here with clear-cut cases,
it will do for our purposes.
• Let β be an assessment of α. Then val(α,β) is the value assigned by β to α.
Again, this is a vague notion, but for our purposes it will do.
We define true assessments as a special case of true utterances:
• β is a true assessment of α if β is an assessment of α and β is true with respect to
all relevant parameters.8’9
6If those are conceived to be radically different, then we still remain with sensitivity to context of use
of an utterance expressing an assessment.
7Such differences include utterances being physical speech acts that take time, and sentences-in-
context being more abstract theoretical constructs. See (Kaplan, 1989, 546) and (MacFarlane, 2014, 47f).
8For our purposes, the relevant parameters are β’s given context of use cβ , and some context of assess-
ment. As a default, unless otherwise specified, we shall take the context of assessment of assessments to
be equal to their context of use.
9The requirement for a true assessment might raise the worry of an infinite regress: from a relativistic
standpoint, the truth of an assessment depends on its context of use as well as its own context of assess-
ment. However, there is no need to go further than that, since we do not require a true assessment on the
second level, we merely rely on the context in which such an assessment could be made. If relativism
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We employ the following principles:
- Principle of contexts of assessment: If β is an assessment of α, then β’s context of
use is one of α’s contexts of assessment.
- Principle of true assessments: If β is a true assessment of α (relative to a given context
of assessment, see f.n. 9), then val(α,β) is a correct semantic value for α as uttered in
its context and assessed from β’s context.
We are now ready to define the relevant notions of assessment sensitivity:
• An utterance α is assessment-sensitive if α’s evaluation depends on the context of
assessment. Specifically, if there are two contexts c1 , c2 and true assessments β
and γ of α such that c1 and c2 are the respective contexts of use of β and γ , and
val(α,β) and val(α,γ) are conflicting, then α is assessment-sensitive.10’11
If propositions are involved, then there are two ways in which an utterance can
be assessment-sensitive. According to the more common relativistic view, which
following MacFarlane we may call truth-value relativism, the truth of proposi-
tions depends on contexts of assessments (Egan, Hawthorne, & Weatherson,
2005; Garcı́a-Carpintero & Kölbel, 2008; MacFarlane, 2014). A less common
relativistic view, content relativism, relativizes which proposition is expressed by
an utterance to a context of assessment (endorsed by (Cappelen, 2008)). In both
cases, the truth value assigned derivatively to an utterance will depend on the
context of assessment.
• A sentence s is assessment-sensitive if there is an utterance of s that is assessment-
sensitive.12
required sensitivity to true assessments rather than sensitivity to context of assessment, we would be in
danger of a regress. Nonetheless, when determining the truth of an assessment, we shall consider its
context of use also as the context of assessment. The assessments we shall deal with, with the exception
of the liar, will presumably not be assessment-sensitive.
10Again, conflicting values must be distinct but not all distinct values are conflicting. See f.n. 5.
11One may wonder whether for every assessment-sensitive utterance, the conflicting evaluations
would find expression in the object language. Here we don’t need such a strong assumption for the
argument presented to go through: we only need that parts of the liar discourse, which we have anal-
ysed as assessments, are expressible in the object language.
12Note that it does not suffice that a sentence has conflicting evaluations in different contexts of as-
sessment for it to be assessment-sensitive: the context of use must remain constant, hence, there is an
utterance of the sentence that is assessment-sensitive.
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We shall say that a sub-sentential expression is assessment-sensitive if it occurs in
assessment-sensitive sentences, and the explanation of their assessment sensitivity
hinges on the occurrence of this expression. Thus, we will show the assessment sensi-
tivity of ‘true’ through the assessment sensitivity of the liar sentence.
My claim is that in the liar scenario, sensitivity to context of use entails assessment
sensitivity. Thus, let us grant the contextualist that indeed context has a non-trivial
effect in the case of the liar discourse presented in §2.
For the contextualists, since truth depends on context, the liar should make ref-
erence to an utterance rather than just a sentence, and the liar discourse should be
reformulated along these lines:
1. (Lu): (Lu) is not true.
2. (Lu) is defective.
3. (Lu′ ): (Lu) is not true.
4. (Lu′ ) is true.
(Lu) is the original liar utterance, uttered at context u. As before, after a failed attempt
to attach to (Lu) a semantic value, we infer that it is defective. As it is defective, we
reason that the liar utterance is not true. This is (Lu′ ), an utterance whose sentence is
the same as that of the liar, but it is uttered at a different context, u′. Now this latter
utterance seems to have been properly inferred, so it is finally claimed to be true.
By contrast to the non-relativized formulation, here there is no explicit contradiction
between lines (2) and (4): an utterance involving the same sentence is assessed to be
at once defective and at once true, but each time a different context of use is involved.
When attaching subscripts to (L) we had to make a choice as to whether the utter-
ance referred to in line (3) is the liar utterance from line (1). Obviously, it should be.
Taking a subscript other than u at (3) would amount to changing the subject, and the
claim made at that line would no longer follow. The same goes for line (2). Thus, from
line (1) to line (3) we are concerned with the semantic value of one utterance, namely
(Lu) that has been uttered at (1). All of the utterances in (1)-(3) are assessments of (Lu)
by our definitions. The assessments in (2) and (3) were both inferred, and are taken
to be true in this reasoning (and the latter is explicitly claimed to be true in line (4)).
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The said assessments give different semantic values to (Lu): ‘defective’ and ‘not true’.
Moreover, these values are conflicting: (Lu) was found to be defective since, inter alia,
assuming it was not true led to a contradiction. Being defective should be understood
here as resisting both values ‘true’ and ‘not true’ (see (Simmons, 2015)). Thus, by our
definitions, (Lu) is assessment-sensitive.
Note that on the one hand, ‘defective’ and ‘not true’ are conflicting values, and on
the other hand, the contextualist infers that (L) is not true from its being defective.
One can thus question the inference from (2) to (3). To this the contextualist might
reply that it is the context shift that makes this inference possible: ‘defective’ is in
conflict with ‘not true’ when the latter is uttered in the initial context (denying that
(L) is ‘not true’ was part of the reasoning that lead to the conclusion that it is defective),
but is consonant with ‘not true’ as uttered in a later context. One can then press and
ask what warrants the inference from (2) to (3).13 Sticking to the main issue at hand, I
shall give the contextualists this move without attempting to defend it, and see what
it implies.
Now, having relativized truth to context of use and revising the liar sentence ac-
cordingly, we are led to assessment sensitivity: the same utterance receives conflicting
values by true assessments in different contexts—not of use (there is only one context
of use for a given utterance)—but rather of assessment.
Note that we have not refuted here the contextualist stance, but merely pointed to
an implication of it. A sentence or an expression can be sensitive to both contexts of
use and context of assessment (that is the reason the relativist takes both into account
for the truth bearers). However, we see that merely a shift of context of use does not
fully explain the liar discourse.
Note further, that we are here not endorsing or proposing a new relativistic ap-
proach about truth. For a recent defense of a relativistic solution to the liar see
(Scharp, 2013).14 Moreover, were one to resist identifying the liar discourse as as-
sessments of the semantic theory, we still remain with a form of relativism: we have
an utterance receiving two different truth values on two occasions—it is just that now
we cannot point to the context of assessments as the additional parameter by which
semantic value can be determined.
13For a criticism along these lines see (Gauker, 2006).
14Scharp’s arguments rely on the idea that truth is an inconsistent concept, and there is no overlap
with the arguments presented here.
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4 From Relativism to Contextualism
Before we turn to specific contextualists, I would like to briefly note two more entail-
ments between contextualism and relativism related to truth. First, note that assess-
ment sensitivity about any sentence leads to contextualism about truth or some other
semantic notion. Let s be an assessment-sensitive sentence, so that there is an utter-
ance α of s and true assessments β and γ used in contexts c1 and c2 respectively, such
that val(α,β) and val(α,γ) are conflicting. Assume that the sentence of the assessment
β, sβ , is “α is true”. Since γ is true in c2 and is in conflict with β, presumably sβ would
be false in c2. Thus sβ ’s evaluation depends on the context of its use, and thus we have
contextualism about ‘true’. Substitute any other semantic predicate for ‘true’ in β, and
we get contextualism with respect to that predicate. In general: assessment sensitivity
of a sentence amounts to the dependence of assessments on context of use, and by that
of the semantic notions involved in the particular assessments.
Further, MacFarlane points out that relativism about any expression entails rela-
tivism about truth:
Note that, if the language can express any assessment-sensitive proposi-
tions, “true” will also be assessment-sensitive, since if p is assessment-
sensitive, the proposition that p is true must be assessment-sensitive too.
(MacFarlane, 2014, 93)
In MacFarlane’s setting, it is the propositions that are said to be assessment-sensitive
(so the truth value of a proposition is determined only given a context of assessment).
Transforming the quote from MacFarlane to a setting not committed to propositions,
we assume that there is some assessment-sensitive sentence s in the language. Thus,
there is an utterance α of s that is assessment-sensitive. Let c1 and c2 be two contexts
of assessment on which α receives conflicting values, and let β and γ be the true as-
sessments expressing those values respectively. Let ŝ be the sentence “s is true”, and
α̂ an utterance of ŝ in the same context of use as that of α. Let β̂ and γ̂ be assessments
expressed at c1 and c2 assigning val(α,β) and val(α,γ) to α̂ respectively. By the trans-
parency of truth (relativised to context—that much is assumed by the contextualists
we discuss), the truth value of s and the truth value of ŝ should be equal in every pair
of context of use and context of assessment, and thus β̂ and γ̂ are true assessments of
α̂ assigning to it conflicting values.
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5 Two Case Studies
5.1 Simmons
To make my critical claim of contextualism more concrete, I propose to examine two
instances of the brand of contextualism that I delineated in broad strokes. Both Sim-
mons and Glanzberg appeal to a version of the strengthened liar discourse and handle
it by relativizing to contexts of use. Simmons (2015) has a version of the strengthened
liar discourse that is very similar to the one presented in §2. In his scenario, we en-
counter a sentence written on the board saying “The sentence on the board is not
true”. We label this sentence token by ‘(L)’. After some deliberation, we conclude that
(L) is defective, and thus produce the sentence token (R): “The sentence on the board
is not true”. (R), according to Simmons, is a genuine repetition of (L): “both sentences
(L) and (R) are comprised of the same words with the same meanings and extensions”
(Simmons, 2015, §2). Yet according to our reasoning, (L) is defective, while (R) is true.
Here enters the role of the context shift: (L) and (R) occur at different contexts: an
unreflective context and a reflective context respectively. Note that here, for Simmons,
(L) and (R) are already relativized to contexts of use. Each context of use comes with
an appropriate truth predicate and a Tarskian truth-schema. Relativizing truth to
context, we can rewrite the discourse as follows, where trueL signifies the appropriate
truth predicate for the context of (L), and and truerL signifies the appropriate truth
predicate for the reflective context of (R):
1. (L): The sentence on the board is not trueL.
2. (L) is defective (cannot be assessed by the truthL-schema).15
3. (R): The sentence on the board is not trueL.
4. (R) is truerL (as assessed by the truthrL-schema).16
Note that ‘true’ in both (L) and (R) (lines (1) and (3)) is assigned the same subscript:
that is so since all the stages from (1) to (3) are concerned with whether the sentence
on the board is trueL. However, the truth-schemas used for assessing (L) in line (1)
and (R) in line (3) are different, and set by the context. The truthL-schema is the one
15The instance for (L) in the truthL-schema is: (L) is trueL iff (L) is not trueL.
16The instance for (R) in the truthrL-schema is: (R) is truerL iff (L) is not trueL.
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appropriate for the context of (L), and when employed, (L) is found to be defective.
The truthrL-schema is the one appropriate for the context of (R), and it rules (R) to be
true (as expressed in line (4)).
The way the extensions of the truth predicate in context are determined is set by
Simmons in his Singularity Theory. Simmons notes that his contextual approach is
also compatible with a Tarskian hierarchy of extensions for the truth predicate. But
by contrast, Simmons’s Singularity Theory only minimally restricts any particular use
of ‘true’, so that rather than being relegated just one level in the Tarskian hierarchy,
it would be generally applicable—except for certain singularities (pathologies), where
the application breaks down (Simmons, 2015, §3).
I shall not go into the details of Simmons’s Singularity Theory, as it is the contex-
tual basis that is here at stake. On that matter, we note that Simmons lays a heavy
weight on the phenomenon of repetition. The fact that the same sentence is evaluated
differently on different occasions of use is used by Simmons as a primary motivation
for the relativization to context.17
Nevertheless, the weight put on repetition is unwarranted. The point of line (3) is
to assess (L). Remember that in the current story (L) is a sentence token. The fact that
we use the same sentence as that of (L) to express this assessment is coincidental. We
could have used a different sentence to express the same content, and remain faithful
to the gist of the discourse. For instance, instead of referring to (L) as ‘the sentence
on the board’, we could have used ‘the sentence written at 16:35’, etc., or just ‘(L)’.
In such an alternative scenario, the sentence of (L) would not have been repeated.
Nonetheless, the reasoning would have gone through. In line (4) we would still ascribe
truth to the assessment made in line (3).
Now in the alternative scenario, as well as in the original one, the same sentence
token (L) is assessed in conflicting ways at different stages, exactly like in the descrip-
tion we gave in the beginning of the section. This, we have shown, entails relativism
in the broad sense, and given the assumptions that we made, also assessment sensi-
tivity: Simmons is thus clearly, even if not explicitly, committed to a form of semantic
relativism. The alternative scenario shows us that the focus on repetition distracts
us from important features of the liar discourse: it is not essential to the gist of the
17In previous work (Simmons, 1993), Simmons does not use the phenomenon of repetition as a pri-
mary motivation for his contextualist approach. However, the essence of the contextualist approach is
the same, as is the implication to relativism.
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discourse, and when the liar is not repeated we can no longer resort to a shift in its
context of use as an explanation for the conflicting evaluations.
Simmons further adds that (L) can be rehabilitated: it can be assessed by the reflec-
tive truthrL-schema, so that while it is not trueL, (L) is truerL. This point of Simmons
is a further (implicit) concession to relativism: the same utterance, assessed before as
defective and later as not true, is also assessed as true—using both the truth predicate
and truth schema relativized to the reflective context.
5.2 Glanzberg
Glanzberg too describes a form of strengthened liar reasoning. Unlike Simmons, who
works with sentence types in context, Glanzberg takes propositions as truth bearers,
and formulates the liar as saying that it does not express a true proposition. We shall
follow his presentation using a formalized language with specified principles.
Glanzberg (2001) starts out by presenting the liar discourse un-relativized to con-
text. He introduces the following notation:
Let s be a sentence and p a proposition. We use Exp(s,p) to signify that s expresses
p, and T (p) that p is true. The liar sentence is formalized as (we suppress quotation
marks henceforth for ease of notation):
l: ¬∃p(Exp(plq ,p)∧ T (p))
Glanzberg employs the following principles, all reasonable given the interpretation
of Exp and T :
(U −Exp) (Exp(s,p)∧Exp(s,q))→ p = q
(T − Id) p = q→ (T p↔ T q)
(T − P rop) Exp(s,p)→ (T p↔ Σ) for ‘Σ’ a sentence and ‘s’
a sentence name for ‘Σ’.
(Exp − P rov) If s is provable from true premises, then
∃p(Exp(s,p)).
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Now when carrying out the liar discourse, we start out by assuming that l expresses a
proposition, and reaching a contradiction:
1. Assume Exp(l,q).
2. Now suppose T q.
3. ¬∃p(Exp(l,p)∧ T p) (by (T − P rop))
4. ¬T q (from (1) and the assumption that Exp(l,q))
5. Suppose ¬T q.
6. ∃p(Exp(l,p)∧ T (p)) (by (T − P rop))
7. p = q (from (6), (U −Exp) and Exp(l,q))
8. T q (from (6), (7) and (T − Id))
Supposing either T q or ¬T q leads to contradiction, so we have:
9. ¬∃p(Exp(l,p))
But then:




12. ∃p(Exp(l,p)) (from (Exp − P rov))
(See (Glanzberg, 2001, 229))
We see that, as before, l in its first instance is defective (fails in trying to say that
it itself does not express a true proposition), but is then inferred later in the course of
reasoning. Glanzberg then argues that there is a context shift along the way.
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For considerations of space, the technical details of Glanzberg’s proposal cannot be
presented here (for the details, consult (Glanzberg, 2001, 2004)). However, it would
be useful to go into just sufficient detail to show the implications of Glanzberg’s view,
and in particular to show that what he calls “extraordinary context sensitivity” is
indeed a type of assessment sensitivity.
In broad lines, Glanzberg’s proposal involves an expansion of the domain of propo-
sitions. In the initial context, l does not express a proposition—there is no proposition
for l to express. By the end of the reasoning, the domain of propositions expands, i.e.,
more truth conditions become accessible (Glanzberg, 2001, 241), (Glanzberg, 2004,
39). At the later context, there is a proposition for l to express. However, note a
subtle, yet crucial feature: it cannot be that l, as uttered in the later context has a
proposition to express. This would lead to contradiction, exactly as it would in the
initial context. It is l, as uttered in the initial context, that finally obtains a proposition
to express. This leads us to relativism, at least in the broad sense: the same utterance
(i.e. sentence in context) receives conflicting semantic evaluations. At first it does not
express a proposition, and then it expresses a true one.
In the earlier paper (2001) Glanzberg proposes the idea of a context shift, and
that the domain of propositions expands. In (2004) Glanzberg provides an elaborate
formal apparatus to show how this works. Let us then focus on the presentation in
the latter, more developed paper.
To model the context shift, Glanzberg employs definability theory and admissible
sets. The domain of propositions available at a context is determined by the truth
conditions available in a context, which in turn are determined by a salience structure
exhibiting the semantic relations available, by reflecting salient domains, individuals,
and relations at a given point in a discourse (2004, p. 39). The domain of propositions
is given by a certain admissible sets construction applied to the salience structure
provided by context. Each addition of a semantic relation expands the structure. We
obtain a hierarchy of structures: each building on the previous one with added ex-
pressive power.
The context sensitivity of the liar, as explained in (2004), is not due to an indexical
or any ordinary context-sensitive component: it is the domain of the quantifier that
shifts through contexts. Therefore, the formulation of the liar sentence remains as is
(for instance, the Exp relation is not parameterised to contexts as Glanzberg initially
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suggested in (2001)). Glanzberg explains that the liar sentence exhibits extraordinary
context dependence, as we do not ordinarily presume that the quantifier is restricted
when ranging over propositions (2004, p. 33).
The extraordinariness of the liar sentence does not lie merely in the expansion of
the domain of propositions. Let us start with a simplistic description of the liar rea-
soning and refine it until we get a better handle of what is going on. We have two
utterances of the liar sentence with different semantic values. The (extraordinary)
context dependence of the liar and the context shift at work explain this, and so we
have a contextual solution. So far so good. Now, the first instance of the liar says of it-
self that it does not express a true proposition. It thus leads to paradox, unless we ban
it from expressing a proposition. The second instance of the liar does not say of itself
that it does not express a true proposition: had it done so we’d be stuck in paradox.
The second instance thus says that the first does not express a true proposition—in
the original context.
We are close to announcing assessment sensitivity, but not quite there yet. The
two instances of the liar have different semantic values, though they seem to say (or
attempt to say) the same thing. From this one might relate Glanzberg’s extraordi-
nary context dependence to the now in use term nonindexical contextualism, by which
the same content may receive different semantic values as expressed in different con-
texts.18
Some have referred to the view of nonindexical contextualism as a kind of rela-
tivism about truth. This is not my intention: my claim is stronger. Nonindexical
contextualism is still short of relativism as I have used the term in that by nonindex-
ical contextualism the context of use suffices for providing values to all parameters
relevant for semantic value, while here, I would like to claim, parameters from the
context of assessment come into play. Indeed, it seems to me that Glanzberg’s extraor-
dinary contextualism is a proto-relativism.19 To see this, we need, as we did before,
to divert our focus from the fact that the liar sentence is uttered twice in the reason-
ing to the fact that the liar sentence is assessed twice. Accepting the statements in the
18The parameters leading to differing semantic values might not be the usual ones of worlds and times
that are in play in “ordinary” indexical contextualism, but rather coordinates as tastes and aesthetic
standards.
19I use the term “proto-relativism” to flag that Glanzberg’s work appeared at an incipient stage of the
current debate with its current terminology.
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discourse as bona fide assessments, we shall also obtain assessment sensitivity.20 We
thus focus on lines 9 and 11 above. Glanzberg describes the situation in the earlier
paper:
...we have found a sentence such that an utterance of it at one moment
appears unable to say anything at all, but then appears to say something
true. Indeed, we first prove that it cannot express a proposition, and then
subsequently prove that it can. (Glanzberg, 2001, 230)
I claim: “it” in Glanzberg’s quote refers (or ought to refer) to the initial utterance of
the liar sentence—it is the same utterance (or content thereof) that is given differing
semantic values. Let (A) be the context of line 9: ¬∃p(Exp(l,p)) and (B) be the context
of line 11: l. Indeed, Glanzberg writes:
...the trivial step is one which would roughly be reported as ‘As used in
context (A), l does not express a true proposition’. We thus find ourselves
needing to make reference to the semantics potentials of sentences in con-
text, in order to clearly state the logically trivial inference. (2004, p. 68,
my emphasis)
While a merely contextualist approach, indexical or nonindexical, will have us look
at one context for assigning semantic value, in Glanzberg’s description, in the latter
context in the liar reasoning we consider two contexts at once:
...speakers need to identify features of the prior context, and on the basis
of them work out how to express aspects of its semantics from their new
context. (2004, p. 69)
Speakers do this since it is the content of the claims made in the initial context that
are evaluated (p. 74), and they therefore hold fixed the semantic relations denoted by
the existential quantifier and the truth predicate as they were interpreted in the initial
context (p. 75), thus:
The conclusion at (B) is made by way of an internal truth relation, which
reconstructs the semantics of the prior context (A). This is a kind of reflec-
tion on the semantic potentials of sentences in context (A). The proposition
20Note, however, that the type of relativism attributed to Glanzberg here is content relativism. That
is, propositions here remain non-relative, but which proposition (or whether a proposition) is expressed
by a sentence is relative to both context of use and context of assessment.
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expressed at (B) bears this out, as it winds up saying that the Liar sentence
cannot express a true proposition in the (A) context. (2004, p. 81)
Viewing Glanzberg’s proposal in the current light, we now consider (A) and (B) as
contexts of assessment of the liar sentence as uttered in (A) (henceforth: the liar ut-
terance). According to Glanzberg’s own view, context (A) lacks the resources to assess
the liar utterance. The assessment fails, and as in previous sections, we may deem
the liar utterance as assessed from (A) to be defective (as is its assessment—as it is its
own assessment). In context (B) we obtain the relevant resources to evaluate the liar
utterance and conclude that it does not express a true proposition. Beyond nonindex-
ical contextualism, by which the same content is expressed twice and receives different
values, here the same content (fixed by the initial context) is assessed twice and re-
ceives different values: ‘defective’ and ‘does not express a true proposition’ (which are
conflicting by the same explanation given in previous sections). And the crucial dif-
ference lies in the resources available at each context for making an assessment, while
the context of use of the assessed sentence remains fixed. Admittedly, our explanation
relies on an unconventional stock of semantic values (‘defective’ and ‘does not express
a true proposition’), but the point really is that what comes out of an assessment de-
pends on the context in which it is made, over and above the context in which the
assessed content was expressed. Glanzberg’s elaborate apparatus for modelling the
interplay of the context of use in (A) and context of assessment in (B) is probably the
most sophisticated account of assessment sensitivity to date.
To conclude: Glanzberg presents his theory as contextualism regarding contexts
of use (even if an extraordinary one). Indeed, we have a sentence, namely l, that
is uttered twice and receives different evaluations. However, I would like to stress
that as in the Simmons case, repetition of l is immaterial. We could reformulate the
discourse in a faithful manner where l is not repeated. The gist of the discourse is that
l, as uttered in the initial context, is reassessed, so the relevant context shift concerns
assessments. Thus, both Simmons and Glanzberg are in fact relativists since they have
a sentence uttered in one given context that receives conflicting semantic evaluations.
6 Conclusion
Contextualists about truth focus on the use of the liar sentence in the liar discourse.
However, the liar discourse is primarily concerned with assessing the liar. As pointed
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out, we might conceive of an alternative discourse with the same concern, where the
liar is used only once. On the other hand, it is essential that the liar be mentioned
more than once, as it is the same item we are interested in evaluating throughout: it is
the conflicting evaluations that lead into trouble. Thus, if we attribute the difference
in evaluations at different stages to a shift in context, it seems that a relativist ex-
planation is more appropriate. Moreover, the contextualists’ appeal to the reflective
or unreflective status of contexts further enforces taking the assessor’s perspective:
reflection is part and parcel of the process of semantic evaluation. And even if one
were to reject the appeal to assessments in the object language, we still find here an
implication of relativism in the broad sense, as contexts of use are still insufficient to
determine semantic value.
This is not a defense of a relativistic solution to the liar. My purpose here was
simply to observe a connection between contextualism and relativism. Consequently,
when discussing Simmons and Glanzberg my only criticism was on the partial pre-
sentation of their theory.
Now that we have seen that the contextualist line of thought leads to relativism, we
may ask whether, from this new perspective, we have a viable theory with respect to
the liar. Initially, it seems that looking at the stages of the liar discourse as assessments
captures an important feature of that discourse. It remains to be seen if the emerging
relativism is worth pursuing.21
21The relativist approach that emerges has a curious feature that should be taken into consideration.
The liar discourse becomes essentially assessment-sensitive. Observe the following reformulation of the
strengthened liar discourse, taking into account that truth is relative to context of assessment (we only
need to be concerned with the first three steps):
1. (Lau): (L
a
u) is not true.
2. (Lau) is defective.
3. (Lau) is not true.
The sentence in the first line might be more easily read as: “The sentence L, as uttered in context u and
assessed from context a is not true.” By similar reasoning to what we had before, we can move from (1)
to (2) to (3). So we end up having two conflicting assessments of the very same item, which is already
relativized to a context of assessment. And applying the contextualist reasoning, we solve the problem
by reference to a context shift throughout the stages of the discourse. Context sensitivity will resurface
no matter how many contextual parameters are fixed explicitly in the discourse—there is no way to
reformulate the reasoning in the semantic theory in such a way that the sentences involved obtain an
absolute truth value. One might object to the explicit reference to context of assessment in the discourse
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